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ABSTRACT
An important concern addressed by runtime verification tools for
C code is related to detecting memory errors. It requires to mon-
itor some properties of memory locations (e.g., their validity and
initialization) along the whole program execution. Static analysis
based optimizations have been shown to significantly improve the
performances of such tools by reducing the monitoring of irrel-
evant locations. However, soundness of the verdict of the whole
tool strongly depends on the soundness of the underlying static
analysis technique. This paper tackles this issue for the dataflow
analysis used to optimize the E-ACSL runtime assertion checking
tool. We formally define the core dataflow analysis used by E-ACSL
and prove its soundness.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Context. Memory related errors can provoke serious defects in
software [5]. A study based on IBM MVS software [26] reports that
about 50% of detected software errors were related to pointers and
array accesses. Memory errors account for about 50% of reported
security vulnerabilities [27]. This is particularly an issue for a pro-
gramming language like C that is both the most commonly used
for development of critical system software and one of the most
poorly equipped with adequate protection mechanisms. The devel-
oper remains responsible for correct allocation and deallocation
of memory, initialization of variables, pointer dereferencing and
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manipulation (using casts, offsets, etc.), as well as for the validity
of indices in array accesses.
Among themost useful techniques for detecting and locating soft-
ware errors, runtime assertion checking has become a widely-used
programming practice [6]. Runtime checking of memory-related
properties can be realized using systematic monitoring of memory
operations. However, to do so efficiently is difficult, because of the
large number of memory accesses in modern programs.
This paper more specifically considers the problem of mem-
ory monitoring of C programs for runtime assertion checking in
the context of Frama-C [14], a platform for analysis of C code.
Frama-C offers an expressive executable specification language
E-ACSL, and comes with a runtime assertion checking plugin, also
called E-ACSL [8]. The E-ACSL plugin takes as an input a C pro-
gram P annotated with an E-ACSL specification, and outputs an
instrumented program P ′ having the following properties:
• if the execution of P satisfies all the properties expressed in
the specification, the functional behavior of P ′ is the same
as that of the original program P ;
• whenever the execution of P violates a property of the spec-
ification, the program P ′ is aborted and an error is signaled.
This is done by translating the given specification into C code:
the generated code implements a monitor verifying at runtime the
conformance of the program with regard to the specification. In
order to support memory-related E-ACSL annotations for pointers
andmemory locations (such as being valid, initialized, in a particular
block, with a particular offset, etc.), the instrumented program P ′
needs to keep track of relevant memory operations previously
executed by the program.
Motivation. Previous work demonstrated that the performances
of a runtime verification tool can be significantly improved using a
preliminary static analysis step [11]. A dedicated dataflow analysis
can be used to compute an (over-approximated) set of relevant
memory locations that should be monitored. All operations chang-
ing the status (i.e. validity, initialization) of these locations should
be tracked. All other locations are irrelevant: the monitoring tool
does not need to monitor them. For the E-ACSL tool, this technique
leads to important performance savings that vary between 60% and
73% [11].
However, this optimization can alter the correctness of the whole
tool. Indeed, if the dataflow analysis is not sound, the monitoring
of some relevant locations can be missed and their status can be
wrongly identified. Since an E-ACSL annotation can check both
for a pointer validity or its negation, this obviously can lead both
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to false positives (an annotation failure is wrongly reported) and
false negatives (a real annotation failure is not reported). For a tool
like E-ACSL— whose goal is to check a formal specification and
that is in particular used in combination with sound static analysis
techniques — this lack of soundness guarantees is an important
issue. Thus, to ensure that runtime assertion checking always pro-
vides the correct verdict, the soundness of the underlying dataflow
analysis should be formally established.
Contributions. The main contributions of this paper include a
formal definition of a core dataflow analysis used by the E-ACSL
tool and a proof of soundness of this analysis. Another contribution
is an operational semantics of the monitor that naturally extends
a standard operational semantics. We think that it is particularly
suitable when reasoning about memory monitoring tools such as
E-ACSL and could be reused in future work.
Outline. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates
our work. Section 3 introduces the considered programming and
specification languages, in particular their formal semantics. The
dataflow analysis is defined in Section 4. Section 5 states and proves
the soundness property of the analysis. Section 6 presents related
work, and Section 7 gives concluding remarks and future work.
2 MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
Consider the toy C function at the left of Fig. 1. It contains a formal
assertion guaranteeing that dereferencing pointer p is safe. This
kind of assertions may be automatically generated by Frama-C [14].
The E-ACSL tool [23] is able to take this annotated function as
input in order to generate the instrumented version at the right
of Fig. 1 (where we assume a 32-bit architecture). If executed, this
instrumentation nicely stops the execution whenever the assertion
is violated, preventing an incorrect memory access. To be able to
check at runtime this kind of memory-related annotations, the code
generated by E-ACSL records memory operations in the E-ACSL dy-
namic memory model linked to the instrumented program [28]. For
instance, every allocation (resp. deallocation) is recorded through
a call to function store_block (resp. delete_block), while every
assignment is recorded through a call to function full_init.
However, even if the E-ACSL dynamic memory model is heavily
optimized, these additional instructions significantly slow down the
execution [28]. Fortunately, a complete instrumentation is almost
never necessary. Here, for instance, only p needs to be monitored.
Monitoring memory locations not relevant to p is not useful. In
this example, when the annotation is evaluated, p is equal to the
address of x because of the alias created by the first assignment.
E-ACSL implements an over-approximating dataflow analysis
to compute what needs to be monitored. It takes care of aliasing
and has already been proved capable to significantly improve the
efficiency of the generated code [11]. Here, for instance, all the lines
of code in gray may soundly be discarded, but the fact that x is
properly allocated must still be monitored.
The goal of our work is to formalize the core of this analysis in
order to prove its soundness. Indeed, if unsound, it would lead to
incorrect verdict by E-ACSL. Here, if the line store_block(&x, 4)
is omitted, E-ACSL would incorrectly conclude that dereferencing
pointer p is unsafe. Even worse, in other contexts, it could conclude
that dereferencing a pointer would be safe while it is not, leading
to security weaknesses.
3 LANGUAGE DEFINITION
E-ACSL takes as an input a C program annotated with E-ACSL
specifications [8]. The whole language is far too complex to be
handled formally in this paper. Rather, we present our analysis, its
formalization and its proof of correctness on a relevant subset of C
annotated with E-ACSL specifications. This subset is large enough
to present the main issues tackled in our analysis.
3.0.1 Syntax. Figure 2 presents the syntax of our language. Ex-
pressions contain arithmetic expressions and pointer accesses (ad-
dresses and offset shifts), and are pure (i.e. side-effect free). Since our
analysis focuses on memory management, we only detail memory
values here.
Basic statements are assignments of an expression to a left-value
(which can be either a variable or a pointer access), memory alloca-
tions and deallocations, and assertions. Compound statements are
sequences, conditionals and loops.
Assertions evaluate terms of a propositional calculus with integer
arithmetic and predicates over memory locations. Terms and predi-
cates notably contain five built-in logic functions and predicates
(detailed in Fig. 3) usable to express a rich set of memory-related
properties [11].
3.0.2 Memory model. Since our language features manual memory
management via allocation and deallocation, its formal semantics
relies on a memory model that specifies read and write accesses to
the memory, here called execution memory (or, in short, memory
whenever the context is clear enough).
Execution Memory. Since our language is a simple C-like lan-
guage, we use a simplified CompCert memory model [16]. Indeed,
the CompCert memory model was developed for the purpose of
defining a semantics for C. In this model, the memory is viewed in
an abstract manner as a collection of blocks. Physical placement of
blocks and their relative position is not modeled. A block contains a
range of valid offsets within it and is entirely defined by its bounds
at allocation time. Consequently, a valid address is defined by an
ordered pair (b, δ ) of a block and an offset. In the following, mem
denotes the type of memory states, while block denotes that of
blocks. A memory state associates addresses to values. These values
have the type val defined as follows:
v ::= Int(n) | Ptr(b, δ ) | Undef
Here, Undef corresponds to the initial value at any address that
was not yet written to.
Four operations may be performed on a given memory state:
allocation, deallocation, load and store, respectively defined through
the operations alloc, dealloc, load and store below.
Assume a memory stateM , a block b, three integers lo, hi , δ and
a value v . Statement alloc(M, lo,hi) allocates a new block in M ,
with lower bound lo (inclusive) and higher boundhi (exclusive), and
returns the updated memory state with the new block. Statement
dealloc(M,b) deallocates the block b inM , returning the updated
memory state where b has bounds (0, 0), which makes it impossible
to write to or read from. We model the fact that some operations
Soundness of a Dataflow Analysis for Memory Monitoring HILT 2017, November 5-6, 2018, Boston, MA, USA
int f(void) {
int x, y, z, *p;
p = &x;
x = 0;
y = 1;
z = 2;
/*@ assert
\valid(p); */
*p = 3;
return x;
}
int f(void) {
int x, y, z, *p;
store_block(&p, 4);
store_block(&z, 4);
store_block(&y, 4);
store_block(&x, 4);
full_init(&p);
p = &x;
full_init(&x);
x = 0;
full_init(&y);
y = 1;
full_init(&z);
z = 2;
/*@ assert \valid(p); */
e_acsl_assert(valid(p,
sizeof(int)));
*p = 3;
delete_block(&p);
delete_block(&z);
delete_block(&y);
delete_block(&x);
return x;
}
Figure 1: A C function (left) and its instrumented version (right).
fail (e.g. dealloc called on a block already deallocated) by using
an option type as a return type. A value of type memory option
either contains a memory stateM (in which case the option value is
denoted Some(M)), or contains nothing (denoted None). Statement
load(M,b, δ ) reads the value at address (b, δ ) inM , if possible, and
returns it. Again, this operation can fail, e.g., if the supplied address
is not valid. Finally, store(M,b, δ ,v) writes the value v at address
(b, δ ) inM if possible, and fails otherwise. If successful, the function
returns the memory state updated with the new value. Besides these
four operations, the model also provides a function bounds giving
the bounds of a blockb in amemory stateM : bounds(M,b) = (lo,hi)
left values l ::= x variable
| ⋆a pointer access
mem. values a ::= l left value
| a ++ e pointer offset
| &l address
expressions e ::= a memory value
| · · · arithmetic expr.
statements s ::= skip; skip
| l = e; assignment
| l = malloc(n); allocation
| free(l); deallocation
| /∗@ assert p; ∗/ assertion
| if (e) then s else s conditional
| while(e) s loop
| s s sequence
predicates p ::= t ≡ t | t ≤ t comparators
| p ∧ p | p ∨ p | ¬p logic connectors
| \valid(a) a valid pointer
| \init(a) ⋆a initialized
terms t ::= e pure expressions
| \base_addr(a) base addr. of a’s mem. block
| \block_length(a) size of a’s mem. block
| \offset(a) offset of a in its mem. block
| · · · pure expr. combined with
mem.-related constructs
types τ ::= int integral type
| τ⋆ pointer type
Figure 2: Formal syntax of the considered language.
Properties Informal semantics
\base_addr(a) base address of the block containing address a
\block_length (a) size (in bytes) of the block containing address a
\offset (a) offset (in bytes) of a in its block
\valid(a) is true if and only if reading and writing
the contents of a is safe
\init(a) is true if and only if the contents of a
has been initialized
Figure 3: Memory Built-ins.
where lo and hi are respectively the lower and higher bounds of b
inM .
For the sake of simplicity, we suppose that all types have a size of
one byte in memory, thus ruling out all considerations of alignment
or overlapping memory accesses.
The axioms of this model are similar to those of the CompCert
memory model [16]. They express algebraic properties allowing to
reason about memory states, such as “load-after-store”. As these
properties are reasonably intuitive, we omit them here.
In the following, we noteM ⊨ (b, δ ) the proposition “(b, δ ) is a
valid address in the memory stateM”, meaning that:
(1) b was allocated and not (yet) deallocated inM ; and
(2) lo ≤ δ < hi where lo and hi are the bounds of b inM .
Observation Memory. In addition to the memory space in which
the program executes, our language uses a second memory store,
called observation memory, in order to record the pieces of infor-
mation (often called metadata) about the execution memory blocks
that are required to evaluate at runtime the memory built-ins of
Fig. 3. This model is similar to that of the execution memory, but
instead of storing data values, it records which memory blocks have
been allocated, their size and their per-byte initialization status (i.e.
which bytes are initialized or uninitialized).
Consequently, along with execution memory, we define another
type obs to model such a representation of the execution memory
used by a monitor to evaluate the memory-related predicates of our
language. The set of operations associated to observation memory
differs slightly from that of execution memory.
Assume an observation memory M , a block b and three inte-
gers lo, hi , δ . Statement store_block(M,b, lo,hi) records block
b as allocated, with bounds lo and hi , and returns the updated
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observation memory. Statement delete_block(M,b) marks b as
deallocated in M and returns the updated observation memory.
Statement initialize(M,b, δ ) marks the content of address (b, δ )
as initialized and returns the updated observation memory. Finally,
read_init(M,b, δ ) reads the initialization status of the content at
address (b, δ ), returning true if an initialize operation has been
performed at this address before, and false otherwise. The seman-
tics of the observation memory statements is permissive: they do
not fail and silently ignore incorrect operations such as an attempt
to delete a non-existing block or an attempt to record as initialized
a non-existing memory location.
3.1 Operational semantics
This section introduces an operational semantics for our language.
The evaluation of expressions draws inspiration fromClight [3], the
source language of CompCert, while statements have a small-step
semantics akin to that of aWhile language, as in [19] for instance.
A noticeable trait of our semantics is that it is blocking: any exe-
cution ends immediately (cannot continue further) if an assertion
is violated. This property is indeed the fundamental property of
Frama-C and E-ACSL [7].
The semantics is expressed by means of six forms of evaluation
judgments:
• M ⊨lv l ⇐ (b, δ ) evaluates a left-value l to an address (b, δ )
in a memoryM ;
• M ⊨e e ⇒ v evaluates an expression e to a value v in a
memoryM ;
• M ⊨t t ⇒ v evaluates a term t to a value v in a memoryM ;
• M ⊨p p ⇒ P evaluates a predicate p to a truth value P in a
memoryM ;
• ⟨s,M1,M1⟩ → (M2,M2) evaluates a statement s in an execu-
tion memoryM1 and an observation memoryM1, then ends
the execution in an execution memoryM2 and an observa-
tion memoryM2.
• ⟨s1,M1,M1⟩ → ⟨s2,M2,M2⟩ also evaluates a statement s1 in
an execution memoryM1 and an observation memoryM1,
then continues the execution with the statement s2 in an
execution memoryM2 and an observation memoryM2.
We consider only execution of well typed programs (even if the
simple type system is omitted here), thus equipped with a typing
environment Γ. We also associate to a given program an environ-
ment E and initial memory states M0 and M0. The environment
E maps each variable of the program to a block in M0, which is
otherwise empty.
The evaluation of expressions and left-values is described in
Figure 4. Left-values are terms at the left of an assignment, there-
fore their evaluation yields a memory location to be written to. As
mentioned before, evaluating expressions does not alter memory:
the expressions are pure. When evaluating a left-value as an ex-
pression, the left-value is resolved into a memory location, which
is then read in the execution memory with a load. As specified in
the C standard [10], reading an uninitialized value is an undefined
behavior. Consequently, the evaluation is valid only if the retrieved
value is not Undef.
LE-var
E(x) = b
M ⊨lv x ⇐ (b, 0)
LE-deref
M ⊨e a ⇒ Ptr(b, δ )
M ⊨lv ⋆a ⇐ (b, δ )
EE-lval
v , Undef M ⊨lv l ⇐ (b, δ )
load(M,b, δ ) = Some(v)
M ⊨e l ⇒ v
EE-int
M ⊨e n ⇒ Int(n)
EE-shift
M ⊨e a ⇒ Ptr(b, δ )
M ⊨e e ⇒ Int(n)
M ⊨e a ++ e ⇒ Ptr(b, δ + n)
EE-addr
M ⊨lv l ⇐ (b, δ )
M ⊨e &l ⇒ Ptr(b, δ )
EE-op
M ⊨e e1 ⇒ Int(n1) M ⊨e e2 ⇒ Int(n2)
M ⊨e e1 op e2 ⇒ Int(n1 op n2)
where op ∈ {+,−, ∗, /,==, <=}
EE-negNz
M ⊨e e ⇒ Int(n) n , 0
M ⊨e !e ⇒ Int(0)
EE-negZ
M ⊨e e ⇒ Int(0)
M ⊨e !e ⇒ Int(1)
Figure 4: Evaluation of expressions and left-values.
Predicates describe properties of the program at the current
execution point. Their semantics is given in Figure 5, along with
that of logical terms.
Statements can be broadly classified in two categories: those
operating on the memory, and those defining the program’s con-
trol flow. The former, described in Figure 6, modify the execution
memory and record the corresponding operation in the observation
memory. For instance an assignment (rule assign) stores the com-
puted value at the memory location defined by the left-value, but
also records in the observation memory that the assigned memory
location is now initialized. Similarly, in malloc (resp. free) the
addition (resp. deletion) of a block is recorded in the observation
memory.
The semantics of control flow related statements, presented in
Figure 7, is standard. Notice that an assertion (rule assert) whose
predicate is evaluated to false stops the execution.
4 DATAFLOW ANALYSIS
Our dataflow analysis aims at computing an over-approximation
of the set of blocks needed to evaluate at runtime the predicates of
a given program. As such it is reminiscent of liveness analysis, in
the sense that it computes parts of memory that may be used later
for some computations. However our problem differs significantly
from the “canonical” liveness analysis such as in [19], in that our
language has dynamic allocations and pointer aliasing. The main
difficulty is to deal with this additional complexity while keeping
the analysis simple enough to be proven sound.
We manage it by: providing the result of a preliminary points-to
analysis to the present analysis, andmaking large over-approximations.
Soundness of a Dataflow Analysis for Memory Monitoring HILT 2017, November 5-6, 2018, Boston, MA, USA
TE-ofs
M ⊨e a ⇒ Ptr(b, δ )
M ⊨t \offset(a) ⇒ Int(δ )
TE-baddr
M ⊨e a ⇒ Ptr(b, δ )
M ⊨t \base_addr(a) ⇒ Ptr(b, 0)
TE-bsize
M ⊨e a ⇒ Ptr(b, δ )
bounds(M,b) = (lo,hi)
M ⊨t \block_length(a) ⇒ Int(hi − lo)
TE-expr
M ⊨e e ⇒ v
M ⊨t e ⇒ v
PE-valid
M ⊨e a ⇒ Ptr(b, δ )
M ⊨ (b, δ )
M ⊨p \valid(a) ⇒ true
PE-invalid
M ⊨e a ⇒ Ptr(b, δ )
M ⊭ (b, δ )
M ⊨p \valid(a) ⇒ false
PE-init
M ⊨e a ⇒ Ptr(b, δ )
load(M,b, δ ) = Some(v)
v , Undef
M ⊨p \init(a) ⇒ true
PE-uninit
M ⊨e a ⇒ Ptr(b, δ )
load(M,b, δ ) = Some(Undef)
M ⊨p \init(a) ⇒ false
PE-eq
M ⊨t t1 ⇒ v1
M ⊨t t2 ⇒ v2 v1 = v2
M ⊨p t1 ≡ t2 ⇒ true
PE-neq
M ⊨t t1 ⇒ v1
M ⊨t t2 ⇒ v2 v1 , v2
M ⊨p t1 ≡ t2 ⇒ false
Figure 5: Evaluation of terms and predicates.
The latter leads to a quite imprecise analysis meeting one of our
primary concerns to keep the E-ACSL compilation time reasonably
fast. Therefore, in the balance between precision and speed of the
analysis, we favor speed most of the time. However, even if im-
precise, this analysis allows E-ACSL to improve significantly the
efficiency of the generated monitor by reducing the instrumenta-
tion [11].
The analysis computes for each program point a certain set
of variables which defines the zones of memory that will be in-
strumented for runtime monitoring purposes. At some program
point l , any block of memory reachable (through dereferencing
and offset shifts) from one of the variables computed at l is instru-
mented. Therefore, although the analysis is formally expressed in
terms of variables, it may be useful to consider these variables as
representing the set of all memory blocks reachable from them.
Instrumenting all these blocks—when maybe only some of them
assign
M1 ⊨e e ⇒ v store(M1,b, δ ,v) = Some(M2)
M1 ⊨lv l ⇐ (b, δ ) initialize(M1,b, δ ) = M2
⟨l = e; ,M1,M1⟩ → (M2,M2)
malloc
store_block(M1,b ′, lo,hi) = M3
hi − lo = n initialize(M3,b, δ ) = M2
M1 ⊨e e ⇒ Int(n) alloc(M1, lo,hi) = (M3,b ′)
M1 ⊨lv l ⇐ (b, δ ) store(M3,b, δ , Ptr(b ′, 0)) = Some(M2)
⟨l = malloc(e); ,M1,M1⟩ → (M2,M2)
free
M1 ⊨e a ⇒ (b, 0)
free(M1,b) = Some(M2) delete_block(M1,b) = M2
⟨free(a); ,M1,M1⟩ → (M2,M2)
assert
M ⊨p p ⇒ true
⟨/∗@ assert p; ∗/ ,M,M⟩ → (M,M)
Figure 6: Evaluation of assignments, allocations, deallocations,
and assertions.
seqCont
⟨s1,M1,M1⟩ → ⟨sˆ1,M2,M2⟩
⟨s1 s2,M1,M1⟩ → ⟨sˆ1 s2,M2,M2⟩
seqEnd
⟨s1,M1,M1⟩ → (M2,M2)
⟨s1 s2,M1,M1⟩ → ⟨s2,M2,M2⟩
ifTrue
M ⊨e e ⇒ Int(n) n , 0
⟨if (e) then st else sf ,M,M⟩ → ⟨st ,M,M⟩
ifFalse
M ⊨e e ⇒ Int(0)
⟨if (e) then st else sf ,M,M⟩ → ⟨sf ,M,M⟩
whileCont
M ⊨e e ⇒ Int(n) n , 0
⟨while (e) s,M,M⟩ → ⟨s while (e) s,M,M⟩
whileEnd
M ⊨e e ⇒ Int(0)
⟨while (e) s,M,M⟩ → (M,M)
Figure 7: Evaluation of control flow related statements.
would be strictly necessary—is one of the cases where we trade
precision for speed in the analysis.
Reachability is formally defined by viewing memory as a graph
where blocks are vertices, and pointers define edges. Following this
intuition, we define the relation 7→M between blocks of a memory
M as “given the memory state M , b 7→M b ′ if there is one value
in b that is a pointer to b ′ with a valid offset”. This definition is
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formally expressed as follows:
b 7→M b ′ if ∃δ , δ ′ ∈ Z such that

M ⊨ (b, δ )
M ⊨ (b ′, δ ′)
load(M,b, δ ) = Some(Ptr(b ′, δ ′))
We define 7→⋆M to be the reflexive, transitive closure of 7→M and
use it to define the set of reachable blocks from a memory value. If
a is a value such that M ⊨e a ⇒ Ptr(ba, δa ), the set of reachable
blocks from a inM is defined by:
RM (a) =
{
b ∈ Blocks | ba 7→⋆M b
}
4.1 Definition
The analysis is classically defined on a labeled Control Flow Graph
(CFG) where basic blocks are single statements (skip, assignment,
allocation, deallocation, and assertion) and tests (guards of condi-
tionals and loops).
For a given program s we note I(s) (resp. F (s)) the label of the
CFG’s initial block (resp. the labels of the set of final blocks). In the
example program s in Figure 8, we have I(s) = 1 and F (s) = {2}.
f = 1;
while (0 < n)
{
f = f * n;
n = n - 1;
}
f = 1;1
0 < n2
f = f * n; 3
n = n - 1; 4
Figure 8: CFG of a simple program.
We define the analysis as a pair (livein, liveout ) of functions map-
ping each label of the CFG to a set of program variables. They are
assumed to be the least solution of the constraint system presented
in Figure 9. As we are solely interested in the soundness of the
analysis, we do not study how this solution is computed.
For a given label l , livein(l) and liveout (l) are the set of live vari-
ables respectively at the entry and the exit of the block labeled l . (To
avoid any risk of confusion between labels and left values, in the
remainder of the paper, we denote a left value by lv .) Like a liveness
analysis, the analysis is backward: the information associated to
a block is computed from that of its successors in the CFG. Like
a liveness analysis, it is over-approximating: it combines together
information originating from multiple branches using the union
operator.
The function gen defines how statements generate live variables;
while most statements simply transfer the existing liveness infor-
mation, new liveness information is generated in two cases.
First, predicates generate the base variables of their arguments,
as described by the recursive functions ρ and θ . The base variable
of a memory value a is the first variable appearing in a’s syntactical
structure. It is, very concretely, the first variable written, in left-to-
right order, when writing the source code for a. The base variable
is computed by the function base, inductively defined as following:
base(x) = x base(⋆a) = base(a)
base(&x) = x base(&(⋆a)) = base(a)
base(a ++ e) = base(a).
Second, in case of an assignment lv = e; where e is a pointer,
if the left-value lv is under monitoring, the assigned pointer e
is generated. The condition “lv is under monitoring” is formally
expressed by the proposition ∃x ∈ liveout (l), &x 7→⋆A lv. Indeed
lv is monitored if and only if it is reachable from one of variables
in liveout (l). Since reachability cannot be computed statically, our
analysis uses as a parameter a points-to analysis A computing
which values of the program may point to which others. We use
the result of A in the form of the relation 7→⋆A : &x 7→⋆A lv means
that there is a path from &x to lv in the points-to graph.
4.2 Correctness
Since our analysis aims at determining which blocks must be mon-
itored by E-ACSL, being correct means that instrumenting only
blocks resulting from the analysis must not alter the evaluation of
assertions in the output program. Therefore, an informal way to
state the correctness could be: “at any program point, altering the
observation memory outside of the domain defined by the analysis
does not alter the program’s behavior”.
In order to further formalize this idea, we need to define notions
for comparing two execution traces of a program. In particular, we
want to be able to compare two observation memories, and state
that they are the same on a certain set of blocks. LetM andM ′ be
observation memories, and B be a set of blocks. We say thatM and
M ′ are equivalent on B, and we note M ∼B M ′ if they “have the
same values on the blocks in B”, that is:
∀b ∈ B,

∀δ ∈ Z, M ⊨ (b, δ ) ⇔ M ′ ⊨ (b, δ )
bounds(M,b) = bounds(M ′,b)
∀δ ∈ Z, read_init(M,b, δ ) = read_init(M ′,b, δ )
Following Nielson et al. [19] the theorem is composed of two
statements: one describes the case of an evaluation step that termi-
nates the program, and the other one the case where it continues
thereafter.
Immediate Termination.
Theorem 4.1. Let ⟨s,M1,M1⟩ → (M2,M2) be an execution step,
and let M ′1 be an observation memory such that M1 ∼B1 M ′1, withB1 = ⋃x ∈livein(I(s)) RM1 (&x).
Then there exists M ′2 such that ⟨s,M1,M ′1⟩ → (M2,M ′2) and
M2 ∼B2 M ′2, with B2 =
⋃
x ∈liveout (I(s)) RM2 (&x).
Continued Evaluation.
Theorem 4.2. Let ⟨s1,M1,M1⟩ → ⟨s2,M2,M2⟩ be an execution
step, and let M ′1 be an observation memory such that M1 ∼B1 M ′1,
with B1 = ⋃x ∈livein(I(s1)) RM1 (&x).
Then there exists M ′2 such that ⟨s1,M1,M ′1⟩ → ⟨s2,M2,M ′2⟩ and
M2 ∼B2 M ′2, with B2 =
⋃
x ∈livein(I(s2)) RM2 (&x).
The following diagram gives a visual intuition of the correctness
property, here in the case of immediate termination:
⟨s,M1,M1⟩ → (M2,M2)
∼B1 ∼B2
⟨s,M1,M ′1⟩ → (M2,M ′2)
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liveout (l) ⊇
{ ∅ if l ∈ F (s)⋃ {livein(l ′) | (l, l ′) ∈ flow(s)} otherwise
livein(l) ⊇ liveout (l) ∪ gen(l)
gen
(
[lv = e; ]l
)
=
{ {base(e)} if lv is a pointer, and ∃ x ∈ liveout (l), &x 7→⋆A lv
∅ otherwise
gen
(
[skip;]l
)
= ∅ gen
(
[e]l
)
= ∅ gen
(
[p]l
)
= ρ(p)
gen
(
[lv = alloc(e); ]l
)
= ∅ gen
(
[free(l); ]l
)
= ∅
ρ(\valid(a)) = {base(a)} ρ(p1 ⊙ p2) = ρ(p1) ∪ ρ(p2) ⊙ ∈ {∧,∨}
ρ(\init(a)) = {base(a)} ρ(t1 ⋄ t2) = θ (t1) ∪ θ (t2) ⋄ ∈ {≡, ≤}
ρ(¬p) = ρ(p)
θ (e) = ∅ θ (\base_addr(a)) = {base(a)}
θ (\offset(a)) = {base(a)} θ (\block_length(a)) = {base(a)}
Figure 9: Dataflow analysis definition.
5 PROOF OUTLINE
The proof is by induction on the structure of the evaluation deriva-
tion. The most difficult cases are statements that perform memory
operations, namely assignment, allocation and deallocation. The
other cases are straightforward, the proof relying mainly on the
properties of least fixed point of (livein, liveout ).
We use two kinds of auxiliary lemmas. Some describe proper-
ties of the equivalence relation ∼B such as the fact that it is an
equivalence relation, how to combine equivalences between the
same two memories on multiple domains, or conversely how two
memories equivalent on a given domain remain equivalent when
the same memory operation is performed on both. Others describe
the evolution (or invariance) of reachable blocks sets when memory
operations are performed.
5.1 Lemmas.
Lemma 5.1 (Domain Restriction). IfM ∼X M ′ and Y ⊆ X then
M ∼Y M ′.
Lemma 5.2 (Domain Union). If M ∼X M ′ and M ∼Y M ′ then
M ∼X∪Y M ′.
Lemma 5.3 (Eqivalence Preservation (initialization)). For
a given domain B, two equivalent memories remain equivalent when
the same initialize operation is performed on both.
Lemma 5.4 (Reachability from base address). Any block reach-
able from a given memory location a is also reachable from its base
address:
∀a ∈ Memval, ∀M, RM (a) ⊆ RM (&base(a)).
Lemma 5.5 (Writing outside of a reachable set does not
modify it). Let x be a variable. For a given memory state M1, if
store(M1,b, δ ,v) = Some(M2) with b < RM1 (&x), then RM1 (&x) =
RM2 (&x).
Lemma 5.6 (Writing an integer does not modify reachable
set). Suppose thatM1 andM2 are two memory states in the trace of a
well-typed program, such that store(M1,b, δ , Int(n)) = Some(M2).
Then for any variable x , the set of reachable blocs from x is the same
inM1 andM2:
∀x ∈ E, RM1 (&x) = RM2 (&x).
Lemma 5.7 (Maximum extension of a reachable set). IfM1
andM2 are twomemory states such that store(M1,b, δ , Ptr(bv , δv )) =
Some(M2), then the following inclusion is verified:RM2 (a) ⊆ RM1 (a)∪
{b ′ | bv 7→⋆M1 b ′}.
5.2 Case of Assignments.
We detail the main case of the induction: that of assignments. Given
an execution step ⟨[lv = e; ]l ,M1,M1⟩ → (M2,M2) and an obser-
vation memory M ′1 such that M1 ∼B1 M ′1, we want to show the
existence ofM ′2 such that:
• ⟨[lv = e; ]l ,M1,M ′1⟩ → (M2,M ′2) is a valid execution step
• M2 ∼B2 M ′2.
B1 and B2 are defined as:
B1 = ⋃x ∈livein(l ) RM1 (&x)
B2 = ⋃x ∈liveout (l ) RM2 (&x).
The execution step has the following form:
M1 ⊨e e ⇒ v store(M1,bl , δl ,v) = Some(M2)
M1 ⊨lv lv ⇐ (bl , δl ) initialize(M1,bl , δl ) = M2
⟨[lv = e; ]l ,M1,M1⟩ → (M2,M2)
We defineM ′2 = initialize(M ′1,bl , δl ), and prove thatM2 ∼B2
M ′2. We distinguish between the case where the block written to is
monitored (bl ∈ B2) and the case where it is not.
In both cases we make use of the following relation:
M2 ∼{bl }∁ M1 ∼B1 M ′1 ∼{bl }∁ M ′2 (1)
in which the first and last equivalences are derived from Lemma 5.3
and the middle one is an hypothesis of our theorem.
5.2.1 casebl < B2. Let us prove thatB2 ⊆ B1. Since∀ l, livein(l) ⊇
liveout (l), it suffices to show that∀x ∈ liveout (l),RM1 (&x) = RM2 (&x).
Since for any of these sets we have bl < RM2 (&x) we can apply
Lemma 5.5 to conclude.
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We can now rewrite the assumption bl < B2 as B2 ⊆ {bl }∁ so
that all domains involved in equation 1 are supersets of B2. The
conclusion follows from Lemma 5.1.
5.2.2 case bl ∈ B2. Using Lemma 5.2, we consider B2 as the (dis-
joint) union of B2\{bl } and {bl }, and we show the equivalence on
each of these subdomains. Here we have to consider the type of the
assigned expression.
subcase int. If the expression has the type int, we can use
Lemma 5.6 to prove that B2 ⊆ B1, using the same method as pre-
viously. Applying Lemma 5.1 to 3 then yields M2 ∼B2\{bl } M ′2.
Besides, since bl ∈ B2 ⊆ B1 and M1 ∼B1 M ′1 we have more
specifically M1 ∼{bl } M ′1. By Lemma 5.3 we can conclude that
M2 ∼{bl } M ′2.
subcase τ⋆. If the expression is a pointer v = Ptr(bv , δv ) for
some (bv , δv ), we can use Lemma 5.7 to approximate the evolution
of reachable blocks sets: RM2 (a) ⊆ RM1 (a) ∪ RM1 (e). We consider
the union of these inclusions:
B2 ⊆
⋃
x ∈liveout (l )
RM1 (&x) ∪ RM1 (e). (2)
Let us prove that terms of the right side are both subsets of B1. For
the first one, using the definition ofB1 and the inclusion liveout (l) ⊆
livein(l) we can write⋃
x ∈liveout (l )
RM1 (&x) ⊆
⋃
x ∈livein(l )
RM1 (&x) = B1.
For the second one, we use Lemma 5.4 in conjunction with the
fact that base(e) ∈ livein(l). This corresponds to the first case in
the definition of the generation function gen([lv = e; ]), which
is defined by the condition: ∃x ∈ liveout (l), &x 7→⋆A lv . This
condition is necessarily verified here: since bl ∈ B2, by definition
of B2 there is some x ∈ liveout (l) such that bl ∈ RM2 (&x). Let bx be
the block allocated for x . By definition ofRM2 (),bx 7→⋆M2 bl . Finally,
applying the correctness property of the points-to analysis to this
relation yields the expected result: x 7→⋆A lv with x ∈ liveout (l).
Now we can deduce from equation 2 that B2 ⊆ B1, and conclude
with the same arguments as for the subcase int.
6 RELATEDWORK
The E-ACSL plugin aims at performing runtime assertion checking
for C code, specified in a rich specification language E-ACSL. Being
a part of the Frama-C framework, it can be combined with other
analyses for quite unique usages. For example, runtime assertion
checking can be used to assist the user in case of proof failures
during deductive verification [21].
E-ACSL can also be used as a dynamic bug finder, see for exam-
ple [25, 29] for a recent comparison of such sanitizers. These tools
implement various techniques, in particular concerning the storage
of metadata necessary for the analysis. There are roughly three
main techniques.
A shadow memory is in linear correspondence with the program
memory. AddressSanitizer [22] stores 1 shadow byte per aligned 8-
byte sequences in the application. Shadowmemory does not incur a
large runtime overhead but its adaptation can be quite tricky when
richer metadata is necessary, as it is the case for E-ACSL [28].
Another technique used to attach additional metadata to each
pointer is the so-called fat pointers technique [1, 20]. There is signif-
icant overhead in this case, and instrumented code cannot directly
be linked with non instrumented code because of differences in
memory layout.
Finally, metadata can be stored in a separate data structure [17].
In a previous version of E-ACSL, metadata was stored in a Patri-
cia trie [15]. This technique allows the instrumented code to be
linked with non instrumented code and to store richer metadata
but execution time overhead may be significant.
Mehlich [17]mentions that “the current implementation of Check-
Pointer could be improved by using static analysis”. Jakobsson et
al. [11] improved E-ACSL by a static analysis (that we formalize in
this paper) in order to avoid monitoring memory locations that do
not need to be monitored. They combine shadow memory (used
for memory locations that only require validity or initialization
checks) with a Patricia trie (for locations requiring more complex
checks). Other sanitizers rely on static analysis to improve the per-
formances of runtime checking [18, 24, 30]. The work that is the
closest to ours in intent and using a proved analysis is CCured [18],
but the techniques are different. CCured is based on fat pointers,
their static analysis is a type system, and only memory safety is
checked. The correctness of the analysis is ensured by a theorem
stating that the execution of an instrumented program can either
terminate correctly or stop because the instrumentation has de-
tected an error, ruling out an incorrect termination because of an
invalid memory access. The proof assumes that there is no dynamic
memory allocation in the program.
Our ultimate goal is to be able to extract a correct E-ACSL-like
plugin from a Coq development. This goal necessitates an imple-
mentation and verification in Coq of the presented static analysis
extended to CompCert C. Our formalization follows the CompCert
memory model [16]. There are several works on the verification
of static analyses with a proof assistant. We only briefly present
some papers related to the Coq proof assistant. The CompCert com-
piler itself contains static analysis for the sake of optimization [2],
including a generic implementation of the Kildall algorithm [13].
This is however related to the RTL language of CompCert. Like Ve-
rasco [12] the presented memory analysis will rather be conducted
at the level of the Cminor language. Unlike Verasco, we plan to
directly implement the analysis as a dataflow analysis rather than
as an abstract interpretation. [9] is a generic formalization of a
solver that can be used for static analysis. However the algorithms
are formalized as relations and cannot be extracted to executable
code. [4] is an extractable dataflow analysis in Coq in the context
of Java.
7 CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES
We have formalized the dataflow analysis underlying a major op-
timization of the E-ACSL tool for runtime assertion checking and
memory debugging. This optimization was shown to bring 60%
to 73% performance savings [11]. The analysis is proved correct
with regard to an operational semantics which reflects the use of a
second memory store to monitor the program memory state.
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We believe that making the memory monitoring explicit in the
language semantics (via the so-called observation memory) signif-
icantly eases formal reasoning about optimizations performed at
this level, and can be beneficial in other contexts. We plan to further
explore this notion in our ongoing effort towards a mechanized
formalization of E-ACSL. This future work can be carried out in
three main directions.
First, the core language presented here can be extended to be
more representative of the real E-ACSL language, making the for-
malization wider. Features such as structures and function calls
strongly influence the memory layout of program memory space,
so this would most probably need some adaptation.
Second, this work is still mostly pen-and-paper. We could make
the formalization deeper by porting it to the Coq proof assistant.
Finally, in this work we have assumed that E-ACSL gives the
described semantics to an annotated program by translating anno-
tations into C code, but this translation is not formalized yet. Since
this translation is the core E-ACSL, verifying it has the highest
priority in the global formalization effort of E-ACSL.
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A APPENDIX
This appendix contains a detailed soundness proof of our dataflow
analysis. Section B recalls the formal statement of the theorem and
presents the global structure of the proof. Section C lists the lemmas
used along the proof; they are stated informally, and only the main
idea of their proof is given. Please note that they numbering differs
from the one used in the article body. The remaining sections detail
all the cases of the induction:
• memory operations, which represent the main difficulty of
this proof, are tackled in Section D
• Section E includes the others cases of execution in which
the program immediately terminates
• Section F handles control-flow related statements.
B THEOREM STATEMENT AND PROOF
STRUCTURE
Immediate Termination. Let ⟨s,M1,M1⟩ → (M2,M2) be an ex-
ecution step, and let M ′1 be an observation memory such that
M1 ∼B1 M ′1, with B1 =
⋃
x ∈livein(I(s)) RM1 (&x).
Then there exists M ′2 such that ⟨s,M1,M ′1⟩ → (M2,M ′2) and
M2 ∼B2 M ′2, with B2 =
⋃
x ∈liveout (I(s)) RM2 (&x).
Continued Evaluation. Let ⟨s1,M1,M1⟩ → ⟨s2,M2,M2⟩ be an
execution step, and let M ′1 be an observation memory such that
M1 ∼B1 M ′1, with B1 =
⋃
x ∈livein(I(s1)) RM1 (&x).
Then there existsM ′2 such that ⟨s1,M1,M ′1⟩ → ⟨s2,M2,M ′2⟩ and
M2 ∼B2 M ′2, with B2 =
⋃
x ∈livein(I(s2)) RM2 (&x).
B.1 Structure of the Proof
The proof is by induction on the structure of the evaluation deriva-
tion. The most difficult cases are statements that perform memory
operations, namely assignment, allocation and deallocation. The
other cases are straightforward.
C INTERMEDIATE LEMMAS
C.1 Properties of ∼B
Lemma C.1 (Eqivalence Relation). ∀X , ∼X is an equivalence
relation on observation memories.
Lemma C.2 (Domain Restriction). If M1 ∼X M2 and Y ⊆ X
thenM1 ∼Y M2
Lemma C.3 (Domain Union). IfM1 ∼X M2 andM1 ∼Y M2 then
M1 ∼X∪Y M2.
The above properties are a direct consequence of the definition
of ∼B , whereas the following lemmas use the axiomatic properties
of observation memory.
Lemma C.4 (Eqivalence Preservation (initialization)). For
a given domain B, two equivalent memories remain equivalent when
the same initialize operation is performed on both.
Lemma C.5 (Eqivalence Preservation (block storage)). For
a given domain B, two equivalent memories remain equivalent when
the same store_block operation is performed on both.
LemmaC.6 (Eqivalence Preservation (block deletion)). For
a given domain B, two equivalent memories remain equivalent when
the same delete_block operation is performed on both.
C.2 Properties of base()
Variable Address. The base address of any memory location is
the address of a given variable: ∀a, ∃x, base(a) = &x .
Consequently, if we consider a trace of a given program, a base
address always evaluates to the same block ; that is, the block
pointed to by the base address does not depend on the point of the
trace where the evaluation takes place.
LemmaC.7 (Reachability from base address). Any block reach-
able from a given memory location a is also reachable from its base
address:
∀a ∈ Memval, ∀M, RM (a) ⊆ RM (&base(a)).
Proof: by induction on the structure of a.
C.3 Evolution of RM (&x) when writing inM
The following lemmas describe the behavior of reachable blocks
sets under memory updates. They are best understood by viewing
the memory as a directed graph with blocks as vertices and pointers
defining edges. From this point of view, the fact that successors
of a block are always in the same reachable set as this block itself
makes the proof of these lemmas straightforward.
Lemma C.8 (Writing outside of a reachable set does not
modify it). Let x be a variable. For a given memory state M1, if
store(M1,b, δ ,v) = Some(M2) with b < RM1 (&x), then
RM1 (&x) = RM2 (&x).
Lemma C.9 (Writing an integer does not modify reachable
set). Suppose thatM1 andM2 are two memory states in the trace of a
well-typed program, such that store(M1,b, δ , Int(n)) = Some(M2).
Then for any variable x , the set of reachable blocs from x is the same
inM1 andM2:
∀x ∈ E, RM1 (&x) = RM2 (&x).
Lemma C.10 (Maximum extension of a reachable set). IfM1
andM2 are two memory states such that
store(M1,b, δ , Ptr(bv , δv )) = Some(M2),
then the following inclusion is verified:
RM2 (a) ⊆ RM1 (a) ∪ {b ′ | bv 7→⋆M1 b ′}
D MEMORY OPERATIONS
Let ⟨s,M1,M1⟩ → (M2,M2) be an execution step, and letM ′1 be an
observationmemory such thatM1 ∼B1 M ′1, withB1 =
⋃
x ∈livein(I(s)) RM1 (&x).
We want to show that there existsM ′2 such that ⟨s,M1,M ′1⟩ →
(M2,M ′2) andM2 ∼B2 M ′2, with B2 =
⋃
x ∈liveout (I(l )) RM2 (&x).
D.1 Assignment
The execution step has the form:
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Eval-assign
Γ ⊢e e : τ
M1 ⊨e e ⇒ v store(M1,bl , δl ,v) = Some(M2)
M1 ⊨lv lv ⇐ (bl , δl ) initialize(M1,bl , δl ) = M2
⟨[lv = e; ]l ,M1,M1⟩ → (M2,M2)
We defineM ′2 = initialize(M ′1,bl , δl ), and prove thatM2 ∼B2
M ′2. We distinguish between the case where the block written to is
monitored (bl ∈ B2) and the case where it is not.
In each of these cases we make use of the following assumption
M2 ∼{bl }∁ M1 ∼B1 M ′1 ∼{bl }∁ M ′2 (3)
in which the first and last equivalences are derived from Lemma C.4
and the middle one is an hypothesis of our theorem.
D.1.1 casebl < B2. Let us prove thatB2 ⊆ B1. Since∀ l, livein(l) ⊇
liveout (l), it suffices to show that∀x ∈ liveout (l),RM1 (&x) = RM2 (&x).
Since for any of these sets we have bl < RM2 (&x) we can apply
Lemma C.8 to conclude.
We can now rewrite the assumption bl < B2 as B2 ⊆ {bl }∁
so that the all domains involved in 3 are supersets of B2. The
conclusion follows from Lemma C.2.
D.1.2 case bl ∈ B2. Using Lemma C.3, we consider B2 as the
(disjoint) union of B2\{bl } and {bl }, and we show the equivalence
on each of these subdomains. Here we have to consider the type of
the assigned expression.
subcase int. If the expression has the type int, we can use
Lemma C.9 to prove that B2 ⊆ B1, using the same method as pre-
viously. Applying Lemma C.2 to 3 then yields M2 ∼B2\{bl } M ′2.
Besides, since bl ∈ B2 ⊆ B1 and M1 ∼B1 M ′1 we have more
specifically M1 ∼{bl } M ′1. By Lemma C.4 we can conclude that
M2 ∼{bl } M ′2.
subcase τ⋆. If the expression is a pointer v = Ptr(bv , δv ) for
some (bv , δv ), we can use Lemma C.10 to approximate the evolution
of reachable blocks sets: RM2 (a) ⊆ RM1 (a) ∪ RM1 (e). We consider
the union of these inclusions:
B2 ⊆
⋃
x ∈liveout (l )
RM1 (&x) ∪ RM1 (e). (4)
Let us prove that terms of the right side are both subsets of B1.
For the first one, using the definition of B1 and the inclusion
liveout (l) ⊆ livein(l) we can write⋃
x ∈liveout (l )
RM1 (&x) ⊆
⋃
x ∈livein(l )
RM1 (&x) = B1.
For the second one, we use Lemma C.7 in conjunction with the
fact that base(e) ∈ livein(l). This corresponds to the first case in
the definition of the generation function gen([lv = e; ]), which
is defined by the condition: ∃x ∈ liveout (l), &x 7→⋆A lv . This
condition is necessarily verified here: since bl ∈ B2, by definition
of B2 there is some x ∈ liveout (l) such that bl ∈ RM2 (&x). Let bx be
the block allocated for x . By definition ofRM2 (),bx 7→⋆M2 bl . Finally,
applying the correctness property of the points-to analysis to this
relation yields the expected result: x 7→⋆A lv with x ∈ liveout (l).
Now we can deduce from 4 that B2 ⊆ B1, and conclude with the
same arguments as for the subcase int.
D.2 Allocation
Eval-malloc
store_block(M1,b, lo,hi) = M3
hi − lo = n initialize(M3,bl , δl ) = M2
M ⊨e e ⇒ Int(n) alloc(M1, lo,hi) = (b,M3)
M ⊨lv lv ⇐ (bl , δl ) store(M3,bl , δ , Ptr(b, 0)) = Some(M2)
⟨[lv = malloc(e); ]l ,M1,M1⟩ → (M2,M2)
Although the allocation is syntactically an atomic statement, it
is actually the composition of two memory operations: the allo-
cation in the true sense of the word, followed by the assignment
of a pointer to the newly allocated block. It is therefore natural to
introduce an intermediate state in which the new block is allocated,
but the left value is not pointing to it yet.
Accordingly, we pose the following definitions:
M ′3 = store_block(M ′1,b, lo,hi)
M ′2 = initialize(M3,bl , δl )B3 = ⋃x ∈livein(l ) RM3 (&x)
We proceed in two steps:
(1) proveM3 ∼B3 M ′3
(2) use the previous equivalence to proveM ′2 ∼B2 M2.
D.2.1 Equivalence on intermediate state. Since M3 is simply M1
with a new block and no pointer to this block, reachable sets are
the same in both memories. Consequently,
∀x ∈ livein(l), RM1 (&x) = RM3 (&x)
and thus B3 = B1.
SinceM1 ∼B1 M ′1 and the same allocation is performed on both
memories, by Lemma C.5 the equivalence is preserved:M3 ∼B1 M ′3.B1 and B3 being equal, the conclusion follows.
D.2.2 Equivalence on final state. This setting is very similar to the
case of a pointer assignment (which is only natural since a pointer
assignment is indeed performed after the allocation of a new block).
We want to proveM2 ∼B2 M ′2, assuming the equivalence on the
intermediate state:M3 ∼B3 M ′3. b being a freshly allocated block in
bothM3 andM ′3, we haveM3 ∼{b } M ′3, which means that we can
extend the equivalence domain by using Lemma C.3:
M3 ∼B3∪{b } M ′3.
case bl < B3. Then by Lemma C.8, ∀x ∈ livein(l), RM3 (&x)
is unaffected by the write at bl , so B3 = B2. We can thus use
Lemma C.4 to transfer the equivalence to the next program state:
M2 ∼B3∪{b } M ′2. To conclude, we use the domain equality B3 = B2
and restrict the domain back to B2 by Lemma C.2.
case bl ∈ B3. By Lemma C.10, ∀x ∈ livein(l), RM2 (&x) ⊆
RM3 (&x) ∪ {b}. Considering the union on all x ∈ livein(l) we get:
B2 ⊆ B3 ∪ {b}. Conclusion follows by Lemma C.4.
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D.3 Deallocation
Eval-free
M1 ⊨e a ⇒ (b, 0)
free(M1,b) = Some(M2) delete_block(M1,b) = M2
⟨[free(a); ]l ,M1,M1⟩ → (M2,M2)
M2 is obtained by deleting one block from M1 so the connec-
tivity between blocks inM2 is necessarily lower than inM1. More
formally, for any variable x , RM2 (&x) ⊆ RM1 (&x). Since livein(l) ⊇
liveout (l) by definition of the transfer function, this impliesB1 ⊇ B2.
Therefore, by domain restriction (Lemma C.2), M1 ∼B2 M ′1. Con-
clusion follows from Lemma C.6.
E OTHER CASES OF IMMEDIATE
TERMINATION
E.1 Skip
eval-skip
⟨skip,M1,M1⟩ → (M1,M1)
The memory state and the equivalence domain are the same
before and after the statement execution, so the equivalence is
trivially preserved.
E.2 End of a loop
Eval-whileEnd
M ⊨e e ⇒ Int(0)
⟨while ([e]l ) s,M,M⟩ → (M,M)
By definition of the functions (livein, liveout ), livein(l) ⊇ liveout (l).
Since the memory is unchanged, this implies B1 ⊇ B2. Conclude
by Lemma C.2.
E.3 Assertion
Eval-assert
M ⊨p p ⇒ ⊤
⟨/∗@ assert [p]l ; ∗/ ,M,M⟩ → (M,M)
livein(l) ⊇ liveout (l) = livein(I(s)) by definition of the analysis.
Since the memory is unchanged, this implies B1 ⊇ B2 and we
conclude with Lemma C.2.
F CASES OF CONTINUED EXECUTION
Let ⟨s1,M1,M1⟩ → ⟨s2,M2,M2⟩ be an execution step, and let M ′1
be an observation memory such that M1 ∼B1 M ′1, with B1 =⋃
x ∈livein(I(s1)) RM1 (&x).
We want to show that there existsM ′2 such that ⟨s1,M1,M ′1⟩ →
⟨s2,M2,M ′2⟩ andM2 ∼B2 M ′2, with B2 =
⋃
x ∈livein(I(s2)) RM2 (&x).
The case addressed in this section are that of execution steps
which do not terminate immediately; these cases correspond to
the statements defining the program’s control flow. Since these
statements do not modify any of the memory stores, the reachable
blocks sets are the same before and after the statement execution.
Therefore, in order to prove some domain inclusion B1 ⊇ B2,
it suffices to prove the corresponding live variable sets inclusion
livein(I(s1)) ⊇ livein(I(s2)). In all the following cases, this inclu-
sion is a direct consequence of the relation between the dataflow
analysis result (livein, liveout ) and the CFG structure, or in other
words the fact that (livein, liveout ) is the least fixed point of the
system defining it.
F.1 Sequence
There are two subcases: either the first statement is a single, atomic
statement (assignement, allocation. . . ), or it is a composed statement
(loop, sequence, conditional. . . ).
F.1.1 Subcase eval-seqEnd.
eval-seqEnd
⟨s1,M1,M1⟩ → (M2,M2)
⟨s1 s2,M1,M1⟩ → ⟨s2,M2,M2⟩
liveout (I(s1)) ⊇ livein(I(s2) by definition of the analysis, so
B ⊇ B2 and we can restrict the equivalence to B2 by Lemma C.2:
M2 ∼B2 M ′2. We conclude by replacingM2 withM ′2 in the evalua-
tion derivation:
⟨s1,M1,M ′1⟩ → (M2,M ′2)
⟨s1 s2,M1,M ′1⟩ → ⟨s2,M2,M ′2⟩
F.1.2 Subcase eval-seqCont.
eval-seqCont
⟨s1,M1,M1⟩ → ⟨sˆ1,M2,M2⟩
⟨s1 s2,M1,M1⟩ → ⟨sˆ1 s2,M2,M2⟩
The proof is the same as in the previous case, substituting livein(I(sˆ1))
for liveout (I(s1)).
F.2 Conditional Branching
Eval-ifTrue
M ⊨e e ⇒ Int(n) n , 0
⟨if ([e]l ) then st else sf ,M,M⟩ → ⟨st ,M,M⟩
Eval-ifFalse
M ⊨e e ⇒ Int(0)
⟨if ([e]l ) then st else sf ,M,M⟩ → ⟨sf ,M,M⟩
HereM1,M ′1,M2, andM
′
2 are all equal (toM). Therefore it suffices
to show that B1 ⊇ B2, that is:⋃
x ∈livein(l )
RM (&x) =
⋃
x ∈livein(I(s))
RM (&x)
where s is st or sf , depending on the case. This follows directly
from:
livein(l) ⊇ livein(I(st )) ∪ livein(I(sf ))
(definition of the transfer function).
F.3 Loop
Eval-whileCont
M ⊨e e ⇒ Int(n) n , 0
⟨while ([e]l ) s,M,M⟩ → ⟨s while ([e]l ) s,M,M⟩
Since there no memory operation is performed, is suffices to
show the inclusion: livein(l) ⊇ livein(I(s while (e) s)). Applying the
definition of I to the right hand side, we have I(s while (e) s)) =
I(s), so that we are left to prove:
livein(l) ⊇ livein(I(s))
which results from the definition of (livein, liveout ).
